EUFOR to strengthen MONUC

EUFOR to strengthen MONUC • Interview by Michel Smitall / MONUC, 27. April 2006 

In recent months, several German delegations have undertaken fact-finding missions to the DR Congo to gain first-hand information of the security situation in the country. As the Bundestag - German Parliament - nears its decide whether German soldiers will be participating in a European force (EUFOR RD Congo), Gernot Erler, minister of state with Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides a glimpse of the European forces and MONUC.

LEADERSHIP INTERVIEW

Mr. Erler, when will the German Parliament decide on a possible deployment of German soldiers to the DR Congo?

Gernot Erler: The German Government can be expected to take a decision at cabinet level on May 3, 2006. The decision will then be submitted to Parliament, which will deliberate on the matter on May 11. According to the rules of the German constitution, the Bundestag has to reply to the submission of the government by either voting "yes" or "no".

What do you think is the general view in the German Parliament to this mission?

We have already had extensive discussions on the issue, and there seems to be a clear position of the two parties leading the government, the conservatives (CDU/CSU) and the socialists (SPD). They alone would have sufficient seats for a majority vote.

We have great interest, however, to reach a broad consensus for this mission. After all, we are talking about the deployment of German soldiers into a mission that is clearly not without risks. For that matter, it is highly desirable that the "Bundestag" will support the mission with a great majority, including the votes of the opposition.

There is a good chance, I trust, that at least some members of the opposition parties will carry the motion of the Government.

Four German delegations visited the DR Congo in the last months. Why?

This is linked to the fact that Germany is one of the very few European countries which has a parliamentary reservation. Any assiduous parliamentarian or his colleagues will try to get complementary information on the ground. This approach should be welcome, because the safer the factual basis for the parliamentary decision, the more stable the decision will be, the more convincing it will be, and the more secure will be the work basis for the German Armed Forces on the ground.

Military experts have suggested that a mission contingent of 1,500 EUFOR soldiers is a small contribution to secure the elections. Would it be useful to consider a greater strength for the mission?

I do not think so. I think there is a misunderstanding behind this consideration. The main armed force that provides stability during the transitional phase is MONUC with 17,800 soldiers. It is not the role of EUFOR to supplement this force - because if it was, one could rather increase the forces of MONUC. It is not the role of EUFOR to assume the very tasks MONUC has been accomplishing quite successfully during the past months.

We are conceiving a mission that is meant for the "hot phase" of the elections, a mission that is limited to a specific period of time, to one location and to concrete tasks. We are very much aware of the fact that 1,500 soldiers cannot do more but discourage spoilers, whose idea might be to deny the result of the elections. So we are talking about a dissuasive force in addition to the work of MONUC whose main forces are mostly stationed in the east of the country, not in the capital Kinshasa.

If one makes the proposal to demand a European force stationed all over the DR Congo, there would be substantial difficulties in providing the contingent. Mobilizing troops is already complicated. We would have a completely different discussion.

You are saying the length of the mission will be limited. What timeframe will EUFOR be given?

All over Europe we are talking of a mission-length of four months. This means, obviously, that EUFOR will need to be on the ground somewhat ahead of the ballot day, which we are expecting now for the second half of July. According to all information I received during my stay here, this should be sufficient time to count the first ballot of the presidency elections, to count the ballot of the parliamentary elections, and also any second ballot, and to cover the transition period until a new government is established.

We will only run into problems if the period between the first ballot day and the potential second one will increase substantially. There is no indication of that for now.

How would you describe the division of work between EUFOR headquarters in Potsdam (Germany), its operational command in Kinshasa and MONUC?

This is a proven division of work. It is a well-trusted model, indeed, of such peacekeeping missions to place the overall command of the operation to a mission headquarters - like the one we have in Potsdam - and to anchor the operational headquarters in the field. We have had several such cooperation processes between UN and EU missions, on the Balkans for example, also between NATO and EU missions. So this is not really a novelty.

One thing is clear: the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has submitted a request to the EU to assume a concrete task that is limited in time. We are not talking of a substitution, but of support to the UN during a specific timeframe. The task to organize for a secure environment during the elections will still be managed by the UN, all across the country. By contrast, the EU will support this task only in the capital where MONUC is not present with a great force. So I cannot see any difficulties that might affect coordination and cooperation. The long-time mission is under the command of MONUC and will very much stay the same.

What costs will emerge from EUFOR DR Congo?

We have to comply with a very strict rule, which says every nation participating in a mission has to bear its costs. Presently, we assume the planned German contingent for the DR Congo will cost approximately 20 million Euros. Obviously, this figure is only valid if a participation of 500 German soldiers will actually take place. It is planned to cover the costs through the German defence budget.

I am not sure one can project the costs for the German contingent onto other troops, but I think 60 million Euros gives an indicative amount for the overall costs of EUFOR.

One should not forget, however, that Germany is also covering a high amount of the costs of MONUC, and that we have provided considerable funds to cover the costs of the elections. One could approach the matter differently by saying that this investment into EUFOR is being made to safeguard the much bigger investments made into the Congo over the recent years. Indeed, we are talking about financially securing the entire transition process to avoid that this investment is not made worthless on the home stretch. That is why I do not expect the question of the costs for EUFOR will have any significant impact in Germany.

What measures should DRC's transitional government undertake to facilitate the deployment of EUFOR forces?

The question about how welcome EUFOR really is, is of paramount importance in the German public debate and to the decision of the Bundestag. We are undertaking these fact-finding missions for exactly that reason, to find out how matters really stand in the Congo.

After the two days I spent here, I feel there are great expectations towards Germany. There is an impression in the DR Congo that Germany is an honest broker - not a country that is pursuing its own interests and that might have already given preference to a particular candidate.

I am very impressed about this tremendous trust, which can also be felt in Germany. It is paramount that DRC's consent to deploy German soldiers in the Congo remains explicit in the coming weeks. We need this as a precondition.

On top of that, we are strongly interested in seeing the transitional government pursue all necessary measures required to bring the transition to a successful ending. I am referring in particular to the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and to the demobilization and reintegration programme (DDRRR). It is necessary that everyone takes part in reforming the armed forces and that the present Government, the Espace Présidentielle, makes every effort to organize fair and credible elections. These are issues that matter utmost to the German public.

This is exactly why we are speaking to representatives of the opposition, regardless if they are participating in the elections or not. We are also speaking to candidates who are not among the favourites to find out whether the government is really doing everything necessary that would justify such a substantial engagement of the international community and the EU.


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Translated from the German original